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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ANA LILIA GONZALEZ, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 900552-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner Gonzalez files this petition for rehearing. 
In Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted the appropriate standard for filing a petition: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for 
rehearings in proper cases. When this court, 
however, has considered and decided all of the 
material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong principle 
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
. . . If there are some reasons, however, such 
as we have indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should be 
promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its 
form will in no case be scrutinized by this court. 
129 P. at 624. This petition for rehearing meets the preceding 
standards in both form and substance and should be granted for the 
reasons discussed below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 18, 1991, this Court affirmed Petitioner 
Gonzalez's conviction for forgery, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990). The Court of Appeals 
decision is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner Gonzalez agrees with the facts set forth in the 
opinion. See State v. Gonzalez, Case No. 900552-CA at pages 1-2 
(Utah App. October 18, 1991)(Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Gonzalez opinion's standard of review for the 
admissibility of evidence contrasts with the governing standard 
cited by the Utah Supreme Court, see State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah 1991), and with prior decisions announced by 
the Court of Appeals. See, e.g.. State v. Taylor, 169 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 62, 65 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Reed. Case No. 900405, page 2 
(Utah App. October 23, 1991). In an effort to maintain consistency 
for future reference and analysis, petitioner respectfully requests 
this Court to amend the Gonzalez opinion in a manner consistent with 
existing caselaw. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
EVIDENCE IS PURSUANT TO A "CORRECTNESS" STANDARD 
In State v. Gonzalez. Case No. 900552-CA (Utah App. October 
18, 1991), this Court stated: "We will not disturb a trial court 
ruling on admissibility of evidence 'in the absence of a clear abuse 
of discretion.'" Id. at page 4 (citing State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 
879, 883 (Utah 1988)). During oral argument, however, Petitioner 
Gonzalez cited a recent Utah Supreme Court decision, State v. 
Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah 1991), which clarified 
and updated the appropriate standard of review. The Ramirez 
decision explained that in past decisions, the "'abuse of 
discretion' terminology [was] used inappropriately. Whether a piece 
of evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always review 
questions of law under a correctness standard." Ramirez, 159 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 16 n.3. 
This very panel, in decisions both before and after 
Gonzalez, cited the Ramirez standard with approval for the 
admissibility of evidence. See, e.g.. State v. Taylor. 169 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 62, 65 (Utah App. 1991) (Billings, J., joined by Orme and 
Russon, J.J.) (the Taylor decision was filed on September 12, 1991, 
just 36 days before Gonzalez); State v. Reed. Case No. 900405-CA at 
page 2 (Utah App. October 23, 1991) (Russon, J., joined by Billings 
and Orme, J.J.) (the Reed decision, filed a mere five days after 
Gonzalez, cited Ramirez for the following standard: "Whether 
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testimony is admissible is a question of law, which we review under 
a correctness standard, incorporating a 'clearly erroneous' standard 
for the review of subsidiary factual determinations"). 
The Gonzalez opinion improperly analyzed the admissibility 
of two pieces of evidence under the "abuse of discretion" standard. 
It "conclude[d] that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
prohibiting the said testimony [of an individual who overheard 
Shannon O'Neill boast about her access to her sister's checkbook]." 
State v. Gonzalez. Case No. 900552-CA, page 4 (Utah App. October 18, 
1991). The opinion also gave "due deference to the trial court [in 
holding] that the admission of the entire checkbook did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at page 5. 
While a different analysis under the Ramirez standard of 
review may nonetheless produce the same result, for purposes of 
consistency Petitioner requests this Court to amend the language and 
analysis used in the Gonzalez opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Gonzalez respectfully requests a rehearing by 
this Court on the matter discussed herein. 
SUBMITTED this f day of November, 1991. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS *Cdk cf the Court 
~~oo0oo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Ana Lilia Gonzalez, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900552-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 18, 1991) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Ana Lilia Gonzalez appeals her conviction of forgery, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 
(1990). We affirm. 
FACTS 
On January 21, 1991, Gonzalez went to a Smith's Food and 
Drug Center in Salt Lake City with four other people. Although 
Gonzalez did not select anything for herself, the group filled a 
shopping cart with make-up, body building vitamins, and other 
expensive items totaling $268.28. Gonzalez wrote and presented a 
check for $300, writing in the amount, "Smith's" as the payee, 
and the signature of Christie Cotner, the name on the check. 
Gonzalez also presented a Smith's check-cashing card and a VISA 
check guarantee card, both bearing Cotner's name. Because of the 
large amount of the check and the nature of the items, the 
assistant manager was called to verify the check. He called the 
phone number listed on the check, and reaching Cotner's 
residence, was told that the checkbook had been stolen the day 
before when Cotner was shopping in West Valley City. The 
assistant manager called the police, and upon arrival, an officer 
interviewed and arrested Gonzalez, charging her with forgery, a 
second degree felony. 
At trial, Gonzalez testified as follows: At a party on 
January 20, she heard Shannon (or Sherry) O'Neill boast that her 
sister allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a loan-type basis. 
At that party, Gonzalez loaned O'Neill "a couple of bucks" with 
the intention of returning the next day for the money. The next 
day O'Neill, who did not have enough cash to repay Gonzalez, 
asked Gonzalez to buy her some groceries and write the check to 
cover the cost of the groceries, plus the amount owed. Gonzalez 
thought nothing of using another's checkbook because she had, 
with permission, used her mother's in the past. In addition to 
Cotner's checkbook, O'Neill gave Cotner's VISA check guarantee 
card and Smith's check-cashing card to Gonzalez. Gonzalez then 
went with four of O'Neill's friends to Smith's. 
Additionally at trial, the court received, over Gonzalez's 
objection, the entire checkbook offered by the State as evidence 
of Gonzalez's culpable state of mind. The trial court also 
sustained the State's objection to testimony offered to 
corroborate Gonzalez's testimony as to O'Neill's statement about 
purporting to have her sister's authority to use the checkbook. 
Gonzalez was subsequently tried and convicted of forgery. 
ISSUES 
Gonzalez appeals that conviction, raising the following 
issues: (1) Was the evidence at trial sufficient to show that 
she acted with purpose to defraud? (2) Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion in prohibiting testimony corroborative of her 
testimony of her lack of intent to defraud? (3) Did the trial 
court abuse its discretion in admitting the entire checkbook from 
which she wrote the check? (4) Did the trial court err in 
.refusing her proposed jury instruction on reasonable doubt? 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Gonzalez first asserts that the State did not present 
sufficient evidence to convict her of forgery because it failed 
to prove her purpose to defraud. We review the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Johnson. 
784 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Utah 1989). We reverse a conviction only 
when "the evidence and its inferences are so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
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which [she] was convicted. •• State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 
(Utah App. 1989) (quotation omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 (1990) reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, 
with purpose to defraud anyone, or. with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to 
be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(b) Makes, completes,.executes, 
authenticates, issues, transfers, 
publishes, or utters any 
writing so that the writing or 
the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act 
of another . . . . 
In accordance with the said statute, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that in order to prove forgery, "the state must show 
that the defendant not only used the name of another, but must 
also show that [she] did so without any authority to do so." 
State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317, 1317 (Utah 1979). 
Utah courts have yet to define the term "purpose to 
defraud," but the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "'intent to 
defraud' . . . is simply a purpose to use a false writing as if 
it were genuine in order to gain some advantage[.]" State v. 
May, 93 Idaho 343, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (1969) (citations omitted). 
That court went on to state that "a false writing has such an 
obvious tendency to accomplish fraud that the jury is warranted 
in inferring such an intent from the mere creation of an 
instrument that is false." !£. (citation omitted). 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
the evidence was not so inconclusive that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Gonzalez's guilt. 
Indeed, Gonzalez's actions meet all of the requirements of 
forgery. By filling in the check, signing Cotner's name, and 
presenting Cotner's VISA check guarantee and Smith's check-
cashing cards, Gonzalez completed the writing of the check while 
purporting to be Cotner. Gonzalez did this without any authority 
from Cotner. It does not matter that Gonzalez thought that she 
had authority from O'Neill. It is well established that one 
needs the authority of the person whose name is signed. See 
State v. Jones. 81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614, 617 (1933). It 
follows, therefore, that O'Neill could not confer valid authority 
to Gonzalez to sign Cotner's name. 
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Moreover, we hold that the act of completing the check 
implies a purpose to defraud. See May, 461 P.2d at 128. 
Gonzalez proffered the check to Smiths as if it were genuine and 
would have gained the extra cash beyond the purchase price if she 
had not been apprehended. Furthermore, the others shopping with 
Gonzalez would have gained the advantage of the purchase as a 
result of Gonzalez's act. Accordingly# we find there was 
sufficient evidence to find Gonzalez guilty of forgery. 
II. EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY 
Gonzalez next contends that the trial court erred by 
prohibiting testimony corroborative of her own testimony of her 
lack of intent to defraud. Specifically, Gonzalez sought to 
present testimony that another person heard 0/Neill boast that 
her sister allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a loan-type 
basis. We will not disturb a trial court ruling on admissibility 
of evidence "in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.11 
State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (citation 
omitted) . ,fTo constitute an abuse of discretion, the error must 
have been harmful." State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 
1989) (citations omitted). 
In support of her argument that such testimony should have 
been admitted, Gonzalez relies on a case from the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit which approved the admission of 
hearsay evidence to establish a defendant's reliance on the 
advice of counsel. United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540 
(11th Cir. 1984). In Eisenstein, the trial court excluded the 
testimony of the defendants' attorney, offered to prove that the 
defendants had given full disclosure to the attorney and relied 
on the subsequent advice. The court of appeals reversed, 
narrowly holding that such exclusion was improper because "it was 
necessarily relevant for the lawyer to tell the jury the nature 
of the enterprise presented to him by [defendants] and upon which 
he gave his advice." Ic[. at 1546 (emphasis in original). 
Here, the evidence which Gonzalez sought to present is 
wholly irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Thus,. 
Eisenstein is inapplicable to the case at bar. The sole purpose 
of the excluded testimony was that another person who attended 
the party had heard O'Neill's statement about her own use of the 
checkbook. Since O'Neill could not confer valid authority to 
Gonzalez to sign Cotner's name, the excluded testimony had no 
probative value as to Gonzalez's authority to use Cotner's 
checkbook. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in prohibiting the said testimony. 
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III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
Over Gonzalez's objection, the trial court admitted the 
entire checkbook from which Gonzalez wrote the check in question. 
Gonzalez argues that the checkbook is irrelevant, and thus, this 
admission was reversible error, under Utah Rule of Evidence 402, 
which states that "evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible at trial." Again, we review the trial court's ruling 
as to admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v, Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988). 
This court has previously held that lf%where evidence [is] 
shown to have supported only conjectural inferences which had 
little probative value' . . . reversal may be appropriate on 
*grounds that the improperly admitted evidence could only have 
served to confuse and mislead the jury or prejudice the outcome 
of the case./lf State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App. 
1987) (quoting Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah 
1985)). Gonzalez contends that because she was not charged with 
any offense other than forgery of the single check, the rest of 
the checkbook has no probative value and only served to confuse 
and mislead the jury. We disagree. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "if the evidence has 
relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant 
crime, it is admissible for that purpose." State v, Daniels, 584 
P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978). The court has also held that intent 
"may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
surrounding circumstances." State v. Murphv, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 
(Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, Gonzalez's claim that admission of the 
checkbook only served to mislead or confuse the jury is 
insupportable because the prosecution made it clear in closing 
argument that Gonzalez was only being charged with the one act of 
forgery. Secondly, the checkbook is relevant to the single count 
of forgery as indirect evidence explaining the circumstances 
surrounding the crime. Thirdly, it is probative of Gonzalez's 
intent to defraud. Therefore, giving due deference to the trial 
court, we hold that "the admission of the entire checkbook did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
IV. REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
Lastly, Gonzalez claims that the trial court erred by 
refusing her proposed jury instruction on reasonable doubt. "An 
appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction 
presents a question of law only. Therefore, . . . [we show] no 
particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v. 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 
P.2d 241 (1991). 
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This court has recently considered the very instruction 
given by the trial courtr and determined that it was an 
appropriate definition of reasonable doubt. See Pedersen. 802 
P.2d at 1331-32. Gonzalez, however, argues that the recent 
United States Supreme Court decision in Cage v. Louisiana. 498 
U.S. , 111 S. ct. 328 (1990) (per curiam) invalidates our 
prior ruling because of the similarities in the two instructions 
in question. We disagree. 
In Cage, the Court acknowledged that the "reasonable doubt 
standard #plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal 
procedure.' Among other things, 'it is a prime instrument for 
reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.'11 Id. 
at , 111 S. Ct. at 329 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
363f 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970)). Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that in "construing the [reasonable doubt] 
instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have 
understood the charge as a whole." Id. at , ill s. Ct. at 329 
(citing Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 316, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 
1972 (1985)). 
Comparing Cage to the present case, we determine that the 
instruction in question is sufficiently different from the one 
rejected in Cage, and therefore it remains an adequate definition 
of reasonable doubt. In Cage, the Supreme Court questioned the 
phrases "substantial doubt," "grave uncertainty," and "moral 
certainty" contained in the reasonable doubt instruction. The 
Court ruled that these phrases could allow "a reasonable juror 
[to interpret] the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based 
on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process 
Clause." Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 330. The instruction in the 
case at bar has no such language. Any similarities1 between the 
two instructions were not questioned by the Supreme Court. Thus, 
Cage has no applicability to the instruction in Pedersen. nor to 
the instruction given here. Therefore, we "need not consider 
whether [Gonzalez's] proposed instruction might also have been 
proper or even preferable." Pedersenf 802 P.2d at 1331-32. 
1. Gonzalez argues that the Cage instruction and the Pedersen 
instruction are similar because both have a presumption of 
innocence clause, both mandate acquittal if the State fails to 
meet its burden of proof, both require doubt to be reasonable, 
and neither requires proof to an absolute certainty. However, 
these similarities are not questioned by the Supreme Court, and 
are wholly appropriate for a reasonable doubt instruction. See 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the evidence at trial was 
sufficient to show that Gonzalez acted with purpose to defraud; 
(2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting 
testimony corroborative of Gonzalez's testimony of her lack of 
intent to defraud, nor in admitting the entire checkbook from 
which Gonzalez wrote the check; and (3) the trial court properly 
refused Gonzalez's jury instruction on reasonable doubt. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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